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B6 FIEND

6 December 1949

MEMORANDUM:

1. It has been agreed between the British and American Services that a reexamination of the status, objectives and conduct of the FIEND-VALUABLE Operation is timely and necessary.
2. As originally conceived and approved the FIEND-VALUABLE Operation had as its minimum objective the development of internal conflict in Albania sufficient to reduce materially the ability of Albania to support the Greek guerrillas. The maximum objective was the overthrow of the present Hoxha Government. The maximum objective was considered to be desirable because:
 - a. It would eliminate Albania as a base for the Greek guerrillas;
 - b. It would deny to the Soviet military, air and naval forces bases in the Mediterranean;
 - c. It would serve as a considerable psychological stimulus to other Eastern Europeans by demonstrating the possibility of removing a securely entrenched Communist dictatorship.
3. Since the initiation of the FIEND-VALUABLE Operation and the original formulation of its objectives, two major changes in the factors bearing on the operation and its objectives have occurred. The first is the cessation, for the moment at least, of guerrilla warfare in Greece and the second is the intensification of pressure by the Cominform upon the Tito regime, together with the corresponding shift in United States-British policy toward Tito directed to maintaining that regime as a stumbling block to further Soviet expansionist designs. In addition, the existence of such an operation and the fact of British and American interest therein has become widely known.
4. The above-mentioned major changes do not, of course, affect the desirability of the objectives set forth in sub-paraphraphs b. and c. under 2. above. They do bring Albania into new focus, however, because its future is inextricably bound up with that of Yugoslavia as much as it is with that of Greece.

D. Brinkley
Reauth D 10-158-41
W. S. Davis
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5. These new factors do create additional dangers, notably the possibility that widening knowledge of the existence of FIEND in its original concept may lead to very considerable conflict between Greece, Yugoslavia, Italy, and possibly France, as to the nature of any regime which might be set up in Albania should the maximum objective of FIEND be achieved. Pending the development of overall policy in respect to the nature of a regime to replace the Hoxha regime, the United States and British Governments would not be able to present any program vis-a-vis other interested governments which might minimize such conflicts.

6. At the present time, we have in existence a Committee for Free Albania, which has so far embarked on no activities in support of the FIEND-VALUABLE Operation. The announcement of its formation in August 1949, however, created a considerable stir on the Albanian scene and its continued existence constitutes a factor of some importance. Propaganda activities to date have been confined to BBC and VOA broadcasts on a limited scale. During the past six months the British Service trained and infiltrated into the southern portion of Albania six teams of Albanian refugee agents whose primary function was to obtain information as to conditions inside Albania upon which we could base decisions for future operations. The results of this reconnaissance suggest that continued infiltrations of agents, particularly into Central and Northern Albania, would have reasonable prospects of success in terms of survival and of profit in terms of reconnaissance and potential political action.

7. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that the objectives and future conduct of the FIEND-VALUABLE Operation be reformulated to take account of new developments, as follows:

a. Objectives

(1) We have so far carried out certain limited operational reconnaissances in Albania intended to discover the prospects of upsetting the present Soviet dominated regime. Our activities should now be directed in such manner as will best enable us to exploit the new situation created by the Tito/Cominform dispute to our advantage. Our primary objective with respect to Albania is, therefore, the establishment and maintenance, both inside and outside Albania, of capabilities which will allow us maneuverability

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in a developing situation and which will permit us to exploit any developments which may occur with respect to either Yugoslavia or Albania.

(2) Action taken with respect to Albania should be designed to weaken or eliminate the usefulness to the Cominform of Albania as a base of operations against Yugoslavia, always bearing in mind the possible repercussions in Yugoslavia of such action. The operation should be continuously reviewed in the light of such considerations.

b. Operations

(1) Future operations should be conducted so as to give the impression that they are undertaken for intelligence purposes, adopted as a matter of necessity in view of the long record of the Albanian Government of violations of international law and comity and her refusal to cooperate with other nations in preserving peace.

(2) We should continue to support and guide the Committee for Free Albania as a potential factor in the Albanian political scene, as a rallying point for opposition to the Hoxha Government, and as a front for propaganda and other operational activities.

(3) We should immediately undertake propaganda activities by all possible channels, including our agents in Albania, clandestine broadcasts in the name of the Committee for Free Albania, occasional leaflet drops, deception rumors, and overt press activity.

(4) We should immediately undertake action in the economic field to exacerbate the already difficult economic situation in Albania, and consequently weaken the hold of Government on the Albanian people and reduce its ability to support operations into neighboring countries. Such operations would include measures to further restrict the flow of supplies into Albania from outside countries and would be supported by psychological warfare activities designed to worsen the internal economic situation.

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(5) We should recruit, under conditions of proper security, a small reserve of Albanian manpower, from among the Albanian refugees, for continued use as may become necessary.

(6) We should abandon any concept of "shock-force" for eventual use in creating resistance.

(7) We should continue the infiltration of agents into Albania, particularly into the central and northern portions of the country, for the primary purpose of gaining operational information and establishing contacts, and for ultimate use in exploiting the situation inside Albania in the light of future developments. The personnel for this activity should be drawn from the reserve mentioned in sub-paragraph (5).

(8) Our experience to date, particularly in connection with the problems of base location and of operational security, suggests that we must examine the problem of participation by certain other Governments in the FIEND-VALUABLE Operation. It may be necessary in technical support of these operations to seek the cooperation of the French, Greek, and Italian Services, presenting the operations, in accordance with 7-b, sub-paragraph (1), as designed to procure intelligence.

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